VI B 3 B.Nr.: 106 /43 g.Rs. Berlin, den 30. April 1943.

Geheime Reichssache

Eine Ausfertigung
1. Ausfertigung

An
VI D

im Hause

Betr.: D u l l e s , Sonderbeauftragter Rooseveltsin der Schweiz.

Bezug: Besprechung zwischen Herrn Dr. S c h ü d d e k o p f und SS-Hauptsturmführer A h r e n s

Anlg.: -1-.

Anliegend wird der Bericht des VM 144 / 7957 über seine Begegnung mit dem Sonderbeauftragten Roosevelts in der Schweiz, D u l l e s , abschriftlich zur Kenntnis gegeben.

Es wird gebeten, den Auszug über D u l l e s aus dem Nachschlagewerk "Who's Who" an VI B 3 zu geben.

Die Ermittlungen über D u l l e s werden von VI B 3 weitergeführt.

Im Auftrage.

SS - Hauptsturmführer

Photostat of a secret document from the SS archives concerning Allen Dulles's conversations with Himmler's emissaries in Switzerland in 1943. A translation will be found on the inside back cover.

DOCUMENTS ON ALLEN DULLES'S SECRET

Published below are secret German documents from the archives of the SS Reich Security Office which shed a light on the political past of a man who is today among the master-minds of the most reactionary and bellicose forces in American politics: Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and organizer of the spy flights over the Soviet Union.

It was already known before this that at the height of World War II (in 1942-45) Allen Dulles played a very ugly role. A special U.S. Intelligence emissary in Europe, he engaged in secret negotiations with the nazis behind the backs of America's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. While American soldiers shed their blood on the battlefronts, Dulles, at the behest of certain U.S. Big Business groups, was working to arrange a disgraceful deal with the enemy.

The SS documents speak of Dulles as the personal envoy of President Roosevelt, with whom he was supposedly in constant contact, being all but his intimate adviser. In all probability the nazis got this "information" from Dulles himself. But these assertions of his have to be seen in their true light.

As is widely known, so far from being an associate of Roosevelt's, Dulles represented that group in the U.S. which already at that time was fighting bitterly behind the scenes against the

Record of Allen Dulles's Conversation with SS Intelligence Emissary Prince Max-Egon Hohenlohe

FROM SS SECRET ARCHIVES (TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN)

CONVERSATION BETWEEN PAULS AND MR. BULL

Switzerland, mid-February 1943

Herr Pauls arrived in mid-February in Geneva, where he immediately upon arrival received a call from Mr. Roberts*. Mr. Roberts was anxious at all costs to arrange at once a conversation with his chief, Roosevelt's special representative for European questions, Mr. Bull. Herr Pauls declined at first, however, and sought information from acquaintances about the position. Among others he saw the present Spanish Ambassador to the Vatican, Herr Barcenas. In talking to him, Herr Pauls turned the conversation as though by chance to Mr. Bull, whereupon Barcenas said that he was a highly influential man and much courted by our allies. Hungarians, Bulgarians, Rumanians (Gafencu**) were always seeking contact with him, and with success.

One of Barcenas's own reasons for coming to Switzerland had been to make Mr. Bull's acquaintance. This information from Barcenas Herr Pauls found borne out by his other enquiries. Minister Kordt, Herr Köchert and Herr von Bibra* and also the Spanish Minister to Berne and the Swiss Foreign Minister Pilet Gola similarly described Mr. Bull as a highly interesting man.

Herr Pauls now accordingly decided to accept Mr. Bull's invitation. I should like to say at once that after his conversation with Mr. Bull Herr Pauls was invited to call on the American Minister, Mr. Harrison, who informed him that he in no sense regarded Mr. Bull as a rival but was on the best of terms with Mr. Bull, who had special powers and whom he had instructions from Washington to render every assistance.

From the above and from other indications it follows that Mr. Bull is the most influential White House man in

* Alias of Dulles's assistant.
** G. Gafencu was an émigré Rumanian politician.

* Theodor Kordt, Counsellor-Minister at the German Embassy in Switzerland, took part in many secret meetings with Western-Power diplomats. Otto Köcher was the German Ambassador to Switzerland. Hans-Sigismund von Bibra, counsellor to the German Embassy, was also the leader of the German nazis in Switzerland.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NAZIS IN 1943

President's policy—men like Truman, Acheson and their influential Wall Street and military friends. These were the American pro-nazis, reactionaries and monopolists who on the eve of the war had secretly helped to engineer the Munich compact with Hitler, and who during the war worked against Roosevelt in Washington itself. Dulles was the representative of just these circles. When he talked to the nazis he was not speaking for Roosevelt, but for those in America who were intriguing against Roosevelt.

We print here the SS-men's records of their talks with Dulles and his assistant. As a secrecy precaution, Dulles figures in them as "Mr. Bull" and his nazi opposite number, Prince Hohenlohe, as "Pauls." Reproduced on our inside cover is the official covering letter that was sent with these records. The record of Dulles's conversation with Hohenlohe is reproduced below in full, in an exact translation from the German made from a photostatic copy of the document. From the other records we give excerpts.

These documents expose Dulles's hypocrisy and double-dealing and show that one of America's chief present-day policy-makers was a kindred spirit and in fact abettor of the nazis. In his political thinking he is not far removed from the Hitler cannibals.

The documents were prepared for the press by L. Bezymensky and A. Leonidov.

Europe, and the Swiss believe, for example, that he is in direct telegraphic communication with the American President, by-passing the State Department. An expert on Europe and a direct representative of the U.S. government, he has been given the mission of exploring European, and especially East-European, problems. His command of European languages is good. He is a tall, powerfully built, sporting type of about 45, with a healthy appearance, good teeth and a lively, unaffected and gracious manner. Assuredly a man of civic courage. The rather older Mr. Roberts, whom we know, is his special assistant for European economic problems. Mr. Bull has developed pretty energetic activity and constantly receives semi-official emissaries of various European states and organizations. He can safely be described as a kind of special ambassador of Roosevelt for Europe. Dispatched from America to Switzerland rather late, he managed to get through Vichy France when German troops were already entering the unoccupied zone, and arrived safely in Switzerland without any mishap.

He received Herr Pauls very cordially and the two established that they had already met in 1916 in Vienna and between 1923 and ...* in New York. Mr. Bull said he was very glad to see Herr Pauls again after all this time and exchange ideas with him, as he had a clear head for European problems; he was fed up with listening all the time to outdated politicians, émigrés and prejudiced Jews**. In his view, a peace had to be made in Europe in the preservation of which all concerned would have a real interest. There must not again be a division into victors and vanquished, that is, contented and discontented; never again must nations like Germany be driven by want and injustice to desperate experiments and heroism. The German state must continue to exist, as a factor of order and progress; there could be no question of its partition or the separation of Austria. At the same time, however, the might of Prussia in the German state should be reduced to reasonable proportions*, and the individual regions **(Gau)** should be given greater independence and a uniform measure of influence within the framework of Greater Germany. To the Czech question Mr. Bull seemed to attach but little importance; at the same time he felt it necessary to support the formation of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism and pan-Slavism through the eastward enlargement of Poland and the preservation of Rumania and of a strong Hungary. He did not let himself get submerged in details, but expounded the view that an apportioned industrial production with assured markets would after the war be the best guarantee of lasting peace and understanding among the peoples. America, he specially emphasized, attached the greatest importance to the African market. Germany's claim to industrial leadership in Europe Mr. Bull seemed quite to recognize. Of Russia he spoke with scant sympathy and remarked that that country possessed an adequately large domestic market.

Herr Pauls had the feeling that the Americans, including in this case Mr. Bull, would not hear of Bolshevism or

*Here there is a blot in the original.

**In the original the end of the sentence, from "he was fed up," is underlined.

*In the original, from "The German state must continue to exist" and down to here is underlined.

pan-Slavism in Central Europe, and, unlike the British, on no account wished to see the Russians at the Dardanelles or in the oil areas of Rumania or Asia Minor. We have here fresh confirmation that for the sake of keeping Western Europe and the Mediterranean free of the Russians Britain would be prepared to split up Northern and Central Europe and divide and delimit spheres of influence with the Russians there. The U.S., on the other hand, wants to preserve a modernly-organized Europe as a prosperity zone, a market, and above all as a geopolitical factor (see, for example, the Anglo-Russian antagonism in the matter of the Baltic states).

Herr Pauls now made a very sharp thrust on the Jewish question and declared that any decent Central-European would find it unbearable to think the Jews might ever come back again; people simply would not accept a return of the Jews and a re-establishment of their position of power. Herr Pauls intimated that he sometimes actually felt the Americans were only going on with the war so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and send them back again. To this Mr. Bull, who in the course of the conversation had clearly evinced anti-Semitic tendencies, replied that in America things had not quite got to that point yet and that it was in general a question whether the Jews wanted to go back. Herr Pauls got the impression that America intended rather to send off the Jews to Africa.

England's somewhat old-fashioned plans of reorganizing Europe on historical lines and setting up various monarchies Mr. Bull seemed to reject **in toto.** He agreed more or less to a Europe organized politically and industrially on the basis of large territories, and considered that a federal Greater Germany (similar to the United States), with an associated Danube Confederation, would be the best guarantee of order and progress in Central and Eastern Europe. He does not reject National-Socialism in its basic ideas and deeds so much as the "inwardly unbalanced, inferiority-complex-ridden Prussian militarism." For this reason he also showed himself absolutely opposed to the fantastic project of re-establishing a Hohenzollern monarchy. To give an example, he seems to see the ideal embodiment of things German not in Berlin, Vienna or Weimar, but rather in Hamburg, Bayreuth or Stuttgart.

Then Mr. Bull turned to the subject of National-Socialism and the person of Adolf Hitler and declared that with all respect to the historical importance of Adolf Hitler and his work it was hardly conceivable that the Anglo-Saxons' worked-up public opinion could accept Hitler as unchallenged master of Greater Germany. People had no confidence in the durability and dependability of agreements with him. And re-establishment of mutual confidence was the most essential thing after the war.* Nonetheless, Herr Pauls did not get the impression that this was to be viewed as a dogma of American prejudice. Mr. Bull described the Atlantic Charter as an important basis; but its excessively wide compass needed to be revised.

Herr Pauls now sought to give the conversation a more topical turn, in order, by means of various questions, to learn something indirectly of the American military plans. He formed the impression that an Anglo-Saxon landing in the Iberian Peninsula was not projected at the moment; however, he thinks that the allies may well be intending to disperse our forces by brief smaller landings elsewhere, after which they want (if possible after conquering Tunisia) to launch a decisive push from Africa in the direction of Ploesti, in order to cut off our oil supplies, force our allies to withdraw from the war and forestall the Russians. On the basis of other information gathered in Switzerland too, Pauls considers a direct landing in Lower Italy improbable; however, he believes that the allies may land in Sicily in order to cut off Rommel and to pressure Italy by air action from there, thus safeguarding the push against the Balkans.

With our European allies Mr. Bull already has very good contact. At any rate various semi-official persons

* In the original this sentence is underlined.

PHOTOSTAT OF THE TOP OF p. 1 OF THE SS RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN "PAULS" AND "MR. BULL."



Unterredung Pauls - Mr. Bull
Schweiz, Mitte Februar 1943.

Herr Pauls traf Mitte Februar in Genf ein, wo er von Mr. Roberts gleich nach seiner Ankunft aufgesucht wurde. Mr. Roberts wollte unbedingt sogleich eine Unterredung mit seinem Chef, dem Sonderbeauftragten Roosevelts für europäische Fragen Mr. Bull herbeiführen. Vorerst lehnte

from these countries positively besiege him. How far this is done with their governments' approval is not clear.

Mr. Bull particularly stressed the United States' enormously expanding production of aircraft, which will systematically be brought into action against the Axis powers.

Mr. Bull is in close touch with the Vatican. He himself called Herr Pauls's attention to the importance of this connection, for the American Catholics also have a decisive word to say.* And before the conversation ended he again repeated how greatly Germany's position in America would be strengthened if German bishops were to plead Germany's cause there. Even the Jews' hatred could not outweigh that. It had to be remembered, after all, that it had been the American Catholics who had forced the Jewish-American papers to stop their baiting of Franco Spain.

About Anglo-American antagonisms Mr. Bull did not speak at such length as Mr. Roberts had previously done. Essentially, however, he confirmed what the latter had said on this subject too.

In the course of the conversation Mr. Bull let fall a remark about a talk in Portugal ("There have been some rumours about talks in Portugal").** Herr Pauls would not respond and put on a show of surprised unawareness. Mr. Bull at once changed the subject, but later on he turned the talk to the personality of Alfonso***, about whose friendship with Herr Pauls and his 100-per-cent nazi views Pauls had himself informed Mr. Roberts long before. Herr Pauls again said that he worked together with Alfonso, whom he had known and valued for years, in Skoda and other businesses. There was no denying that Alfonso possessed certain qualities and farsightedness. But there should be no illusions to the effect that this man was not a true follower of the Führer. This apparently was no news to Mr. Bull, who declared that he would be ready to meet Alfonso at any time and was prepared to give every assurance of fair play. Mr. Bull even went so far as to propose a code-word for a telephone call by Alfonso. Herr Pauls took note of these statements of Mr. Bull's, and it was particularly interesting that the latter seemed especially anxious to hear in undistorted form the salient views of an up-to-date and candid National-Socialist. Should Alfonso be unable to come, Mr. Bull hoped for much from a talk with State Councillor Lindemann of the North German Lloyd*. Herr Lindemann seems, on business grounds, to enjoy personal prestige in the United States.

The conversation ended on a friendly note and Mr. Bull offered of himself to instruct the American Embassy in Madrid to be at Herr Pauls's service at any time. Mr Bull specially referred to Embassy Counsellor Buttleworth (?),** whom he described as the most capable.

The following day Herr Pauls had another short meeting with Mr. Roberts, who spoke with much satisfaction of the course of the Pauls-Bull conversation and said that Roosevelt himself, who had known Herr Pauls in the past, had instructed Mr. Bull to talk to him.

The same day Herr Pauls also had a brief meeting with the American Minister, Mr. Harrison, who stressed that Herr Pauls should not think there were any differences between him and Bull over their prerogatives. They were on the friendliest terms, and Bull had direct assignments and powers from the White House.

*In the original the second half of this sentence is underlined.

**The sentence in brackets is in English.

***In the original this name is underlined.

*Karl Lindemann was a prominent German businessman with important connections in the United States, president of the supervisory council of the North German Lloyd line in Bremen and member of the supervisory councils of a dozen other firms. He was closely connected with the nazi upper crust. Among his colleagues on the North German Lloyd council was State Secretary Wilhelm Keppler, and in the leadership of the Dresdner Bank he was associated with Dr. Karl Rasche, the personal banker of Himmler.

** Thus in the text.

Washington Confederate of the Nazis

There are documents of the past whose publication turns a sudden revealing searchlight upon the darker corners of the world scene. Just a few pages of typescript, yet everything stands out crystal-clear. Men and events are seen for what they were. What many may have refused and feared to believe is confirmed beyond all manner of doubt. What was hitherto blurred and dim comes into sharp focus. And, most important of all, the searchlight illumines the present as well as the past. The documents *New Times* is publishing today are of just this description.

Their origin can be explained in a very few words. They are documents from the archives of Department VI of the SS Reich Security Office—Himmler's foreign intelligence. They are marked "Top state secret." One of them is signed by SS Hauptsturmführer Ahrens of the West-European Division of Department VI. Everything goes to show that they were intended for the top nazi leadership.

What are the documents about? They are records of secret conversations held in Switzerland in January-April 1943 between representatives of Hitler Germany and certain American personalities. They were drawn up by the German representatives themselves or on

the basis of their reports. And they are certainly thorough. With the meticulous efficiency characteristic of the Gestapo machine, they give the minutest details about the content of the conversations and about the Americans themselves. Thus, in one of the records is included the information that the chief U.S. representative has "good teeth."

There are talks in Berne and in Geneva. The emissaries of Hitler and of Washington exchange compliments, hints, secret proposals. For the most part they talk straight: there is no one to hear them. When is all this happening?

The beginning of 1943. It is the decisive moment of the war. The eyes of the whole world are fixed on the Eastern front, where the Soviet troops have for a year and a half been meeting the onslaught of over 200 fascist divisions. The Soviet people's strength is taxed to the limit. The civilian population deny themselves everything to keep the army supplied. People go hungry, live in unheated homes, never know a moment's rest. On the battlefronts the blood of the soldiers who stopped Hitler's hordes flows day after day, night after night. The Soviet people suffer and strain as no other nation of the anti-Hitler coalition, but they stand firm as rock. At Stalingrad the battle that will decide the outcome of the war and the future of the world is drawing to its close.

In the West things are still the same. The second front, promised before the end of 1942, is still on paper. American and British action in Europe is confined to air operations. Nearly all Hitler's forces are concentrated in the East. In January 1943 Churchill and Roosevelt meet at Casablanca and inform the head of the Soviet government of their firm intention to "bring Germany to her knees in 1943."

"We are in no doubt," they declare, "that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theatre.... Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion...."

The meeting at which the two Western leaders drew up this message began on January 14. And the next day, January 15, Allen Dulles, American intelligence envoy in Europe, made secret contact in Switzerland with emissaries of Hitler.

* * *

The SS records name four participants in the conversations: "Pauls" and "Bauer" on the German side and "Bull" and "Roberts" on the American. These were, of course, all aliases used for secrecy's sake.

"In the period between January 15 and April 3, 1943," we read in these records, "Herr Pauls and Herr Bauer had three conversations in Berne and Geneva with Mr. Bull and Mr. Roberts, Herr Pauls himself conducting two conversations. The third conversation was conducted by Herr Bauer."

Who was "Herr Pauls"? It was that well-known international agent of Hitler's, Prince Max-Egon Hohenlohe, whose job was backstage contacts with influential Western politicians. In the summer of 1938 Hohenlohe arranged a meeting at his castle in the Sudeten between the British Minister Runciman and the fascist chieftain Henlein. A few weeks after came Chamberlain and Bonnet's shameful Munich betrayal.

Hohenlohe's wife, the Spanish marquise Belvis de las Navas, likewise served as intermediary in secret Anglo-German negotiations before the war. After the seizure of Czechoslovakia Hohenlohe became a member of the supervisory council of the Skoda munitions concern, which passed into the sphere of influence of Göring's trust, the Reichswerke Hermann Göring. Two of Hohenlohe's brothers were officers in the SS troops. At the beginning of 1943 this secret agent of a prince arrived in Switzerland as a "private citizen."

And who was "Mr. Bull"? That is no secret now either. The official covering letter to the records of the conversations, signed by SS Hauptsturmführer Ahrens and reproduced on our front inside cover, directly identifies "Bull" as "Dulles." It is Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles and today director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. In 1943 he was the American intelligence (OSS) emissary in Europe, with headquarters at Berne.

That "Bull" and Allen Dulles are the same person there cannot be the slightest doubt. Apart from the direct proof in Ahrens's letter, there is confirmation of it from Dulles himself. The SS records say of him: "Dispatched from America to Switzerland rather late, he managed to get through Vichy France when German troops were already entering the unoccupied zone." In his book "Germany's Underground," published in New York in 1947, Dulles describes his journey to Switzerland in practically the same words.

The nazi spy network was quick to note his arrival. We know that from the reminiscences of two important members of it: Hans Bernd Gisevius, secret agent of the Abwehr (Canaris's military intelligence) in Switzerland, and the SS intelligence resident, Sturmbannführer Wilhelm Höttl. Both the Abwehr and the SS at once "registered" Dulles's appearance in Berne. In fact, they even managed to decode his radiotelegrams to Washington.

What did Dulles come to Switzerland for? To make contact with Hitler Germany. There will hardly have been another prominent U. S. government official at

the time with such extensive and important connections among the nazis. Old friends of his were high up in Hitler's Reich. The German representative of the Dulles brothers' law firm, Gerhard Westrick, was one of the "Military Economy Führers." Baron von Schröder, the German partner of the New York banking house of Schroder, of which Dulles was a director, was an SS general and administered the fund out of which Himmler set up concentration camps. Dulles's assistant in Switzerland was the German-American Gero von Schulze-Gävernitz, son-in-law of the Ruhr magnate Stinnes and brother-in-law of Grand Admiral Dönitz, the German naval commander-in-chief. Another assistant he obtained, in the guise of American vice-consul at Zürich, was W. Lada-Mocarski, vice-president of the Schroder Bank.

In negotiating with Dulles, the emissaries of Himmler knew what they were about.

The nazi leaders had long been trying to break up the anti-Hitler coalition. Knowing that in the West German imperialism had long-standing friends, Hitler and his clique hoped to be able to use them for a piece of *political sabotage* that would save the Third Reich from disaster.

In the posthumous memoirs of the chief of the SS intelligence, Walter Schellenberg, it has now been disclosed that at a secret conference as early as the latter half of 1942 Himmler and Schellenberg arrived at the conclusion that to explore the possibilities of making a deal with the West was an urgent necessity. Schellenberg set his whole army of secret emissaries to work, and at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 they came up with several possibilities of the kind. One such possibility was provided by Allen Dulles.

Such were the chief representatives of Germany and America in the secret discussions in Switzerland in 1943. On both sides, intelligence-cum-business men, closely connected with the arms monopolies. On both sides, enemies of the Soviet Union. On one side Allen Dulles, on the other, an emissary of Himmler.

At Stalingrad the Soviet fighting men were paying with their blood to save the freedom of mankind. In Casablanca Churchill and Roosevelt were pledging themselves to "bring Germany to her knees" and "spare no exertion." In Switzerland Prince Hohenlohe and Allen Dulles, meeting in private, had cosy heart-to-heart talks. In one of the SS records Dulles is described in so many words as "a friend of Herr Pauls," that is, of the nazi Hohenlohe.

Another interesting point: the initiative of holding these talks came from Dulles. We learn from the documents that when Hohenlohe arrived in mid-February in Geneva, he immediately received a call from "Mr. Roberts," "Mr. Bull's" representative, who "was anxious at all costs to arrange at once a conversation" between Hohenlohe and his chief. And the record of a talk held on March 21 between this "Mr. Roberts" and "Herr Bauer" says that "Roberts" conveyed to the SS emissary a supper invitation from Dulles, adding that the latter would "discuss problems fairly and openly" and that "he vouched as a gentleman that the conversation would be kept secret."

But that is no longer in his power. The secret has come out....

* * *

The SS records of the talks give a sufficiently detailed account of what Dulles said. As may be seen from the record of the mid-February talk, Dulles complained of Hitler. Because Hitler followed a fascist policy? Because nazi Germany had become the embodiment of barbarism, obscurantism, of a regime of unparalleled oppression and coercion? Because Hitler's policy ran counter to the Atlantic Charter principles proclaimed by America and Britain?

Not at all. All that didn't trouble Dulles. In fact, many of his statements, meticulously recorded by his German collocutors, show that essentially he was in agreement with the "ideas" and "principles" of Hitlerism. In the record of the Dulles-Hohenlohe talk, published above, we read that Dulles "does not reject National-Socialism in its basic ideas and deeds." In the document summarizing all the conversations between January 15 and April 3 ("Record of Conversations with Mr. Bull and Mr. Roberts"), we find him calling Hitler "a man of genius," while in the talk with Hohenlohe he expresses "respect" for "the historical importance of Adolf Hitler and his work." In the nazi "experiment" he saw a manifestation of "heroism" sprung from "want and injustice."

More, he in effect concurred in the nazi policy of wiping out the Jews. After mentioning that Hohenlohe made "a very sharp thrust on the Jewish question," the record of the Dulles-Hohenlohe talk says that Dulles "in the course of the conversation had clearly evinced anti-Semitic tendencies." And his assistant "Roberts," talking to "Bauer" on March 21, advised the nazis to "act more skilfully in the Jewish question" and employ "the hypocritical Anglo-Saxon method," which "led to practical success without causing a big stir and providing targets for attack."

Hitler's "Oswiecim machine" was working full blast. Hundreds of thousands of Jews, herded here from all over Europe, were being burned in its ovens. And at this moment Allen Dulles, a representative of American democracy, as good as endorsed the nazis' foul racialism, and his assistant even instructed them in the art of hypocrisy, telling them to dispose of

This photo, published in the West-German Spiegel magazine on April 27 of this year, shows Allen Dulles (right) talking to the German intelligence agent Hans Bernd Gisevius. Gisevius worked both for Dulles and for the nazi military intelligence chief, Admiral Canaris.

the Jews more neatly, without causing a great big stir....

No, Dulles had no objection to Hitler or fascism. The one thing he objected to was that Hitler had been too precipitate and headlong, he had struck too soon and in the wrong place.

"It had been a tremendous mistake on Germany's part to carry things to the length of war," said "Roberts" in his talk with "Bauer" on March 21, meaning war with the Western Powers. "In the course of peaceful development all Southeastern Europe would before long have fallen de facto into Germany's hands, for neither Britain nor America had had the intention or energy to resist such a peaceful development by armed force without particular cause. If Germany had then one day taken over and developed these areas, it would have found it an easy matter to fight a one-front war against Russia." After Germany's victory over Russia Britain and America would have had "willy-nilly to accept Germany's superiority."

Why did you bungle things so?—this U.S. intelligence emissary in effect reproached the nazis. "Why the nazis should have hammered at an open door was incomprehensible," he declared verbatim.

"By its psychological mistakes," says the "Record of Conversations with Mr. Bull and Mr. Roberts," "the German government had succeeded in alarming the Anglo-Saxons and making possible the introduction of conscription in Britain, rearmament, and the United States' abandonment of isolationism. This behaviour of Germany's was particularly incomprehensible to them [Dulles and "Roberts"] as Germany would have achieved these objects by peaceful means without serious Anglo-Saxon resistance (and France was notoriously weak)." Also set forth in this record are the following ideas of Dulles's:

"By hammering at an open door the Germans had evoked alarm and spoiled their own chances. Germany had itself provided the anti-Germans with material for propaganda...."

If it had acted more astutely, "the Anglo-Saxon peoples could never have been roused...."

"Germany had—the Americans said—missed its unique opportunity...."

Dulles was in fact telling the nazis that if in 1939, instead of breaking with the Western Powers, they had at once struck at the East, America would still have been on their side now and would have "presented" them with Europe as their reward.

In other words, the SS documents on the American-German conversations in Switzerland in 1943 show yet again, and as nakedly and bluntly as can be, without any fig-leaves whatever, what the eve-of-war Munich-men had in mind: making continental Europe the empire of Hitler.

* * *

In 1943, however, Dulles was not primarily concerned with discoursing on the past and reminding the nazis of their "clumsiness" and "bungling." He did not conjure up the shade of Munich to engage in historical debates, but in order to *resurrect Munich*, resurrect it at the very height of the war, by putting through another backstage deal. That was what he had come to Switzerland for. And so had Himmler's men.

All is not lost yet, the American emissaries intimated to their nazi opposite numbers. "Roberts" told "Bauer" (record of the March 21 talk) that "America did not want to fight a war every twenty years and now desired a lasting settlement, in the making of which it wanted to have a decisive part itself, and not leave it again, after all the unfortunate past experience, to Britain alone. Only it was a pity that Germany had excluded itself, for it was a country much to be admired and which appealed to him much more than many others. He still hoped that it would continue to exist as a factor of order, and would in the future too play a proper part."

Just what part? The SS records give us the answer to that also.

Dulles and "Roberts" spoke of "the new order in Europe, which one day would become acceptable to the Anglo-Saxons too and would serve as the basis for a new world order." Germany "must, by proposing a constructive solution, try to influence allied minds also. They, the two Americans, could imagine for example that a settlement of the Czech question

within the framework of the Reich might one day prove quite acceptable after all." Dulles declared that "there could be no question" of the separation of Austria from Germany. He indicated that he quite recognized Germany's claim to industrial leadership in Europe, and that a "federal Greater Germany (similar to the United States), with an associated Danube Confederation, would be the best guarantee of order and progress in Central and Eastern Europe."

The thing is unmistakable. Allen Dulles was proposing to Prince Hohenlohe in 1943 *the very same terms as the Western Powers had proposed to Hitler at Munich.* Three and a half years after Germany's assault on Poland, three years after the fall of Paris, the British debacle at Dunkirk, the subjugation of Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, the OSS emissary was again raising the old banner of Europe's gravediggers. He still wanted to buy Hitler, and still out of the same motives. In his talk with Hohenlohe he openly pronounced for a "cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism." A cordon sanitaire against those who were then repelling the last general onslaught of the freedom-loving nations' enemies. And that was what Himmler too wanted.

The compact Dulles proposed to the SS-men was not only perfidy in regard to the Soviet Union. It was a gross flouting of Roosevelt's policy. The United States and Britain had proclaimed, in January 1943, their intention of securing Germany's "unconditional surrender"; Dulles was negotiating for a *deal* with the nazis. The United States officially demanded the re-establishment of an independent Austria; Dulles endorsed the Anschluss. The United States maintained diplomatic relations with the Czechoslovak government in exile; Dulles meant to leave Czechoslovakia "within the framework of the Reich."

Allen Dulles was not expressing the sentiments of the American people. The American government did not, in the upshot, make a deal with the nazis. Fortunately for America, her leading statesmen, notably President Roosevelt, did not share Dulles's views. They went on fighting for the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. Behind Dulles stood specific groups: the billionaires, death merchants, fascists and semi-fascists who on the eve of the freedom-loving nations' decisive victory wanted out of their selfish and reactionary motives to stab Hitler's chief adversary in the back.

In 1949, after the publication of the Soviet Information Bureau's historical survey "Falsifiers of History," containing brief excerpts from the SS documents, Allen Dulles declared that the only Germans he had met during the war had been opponents of Hitler. In saying that he told a lie, just as he did eleven years later when he declared that the U-2 spy plane shot down over Soviet territory had been engaged in weather studies over Turkey.

* * *

What was the outcome of Dulles's talks in Switzerland in 1943?

Judging by the documents in the SS archives, the Dulles-Hohenlohe conversations were meant as a prelude to negotiations on a broader basis. To be sure, both sides were aware that making a separate peace wouldn't be so simple. And not only because of the Soviet Union. The British people wouldn't have put up with it either. "Washington was very displeased" with Britain, Himmler's emissaries noted in their records of the talks in Switzerland.

Dulles also feared resistance from another quarter: the American people. "It was hardly conceivable," he told the nazis, "that the Anglo-Saxons' worked-up public opinion could accept Hitler as unchallenged master of Greater Germany." "Roberts" stressed this too: "The hatred it [Germany] had piled up against itself was a fact that had to be reckoned with. At the moment allied public opinion in no way allowed of a compromise."

All the same, the nazis apparently did have some reason to hope for a separate peace. In one of the records their emissaries noted that they had managed to "shake" their American collocutors in "certain fundamentally incorrect opinions about Germany."

It is at any rate certain that afterwards too Dulles maintained contact with the SS chiefs, notably Himmler's No. 1 assistant Kaltenbrunner. In the records of the 1946 Nuremberg trial of major war criminals there is this dialogue:

Defence Counsel Kauffmann: "I now mention the name Dulles. Did you have direct or indirect contact with him?..."

Kaltenbrunner: "Yes, I was in contact with him, namely through Höttl...."

Kaltenbrunner went on to say that he had first sought contact with Dulles in the spring of 1943, and that Dulles had been visited "not only by Höttl but by several other persons." In addition, the SS intelligence made contact with a number of American representatives in Sweden, its chief, Walter Schellenberg, going there for the purpose.

Nothing came of it all. Dulles's separate-peace negotiations never bore fruit. And the main reason can be put very concisely: the victories of the Soviet army.

* * *

The past?

No, not only. The SS documents on Dulles's Swiss doings are seventeen years old, but they have not

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

PALTRY RESULTS

Life recently published a series of articles on American "national purpose." The initiative in discussing the theme, however, did not belong to the magazine. For the question of "Whither the United States?" had long been giving a headache to Washington leaders.

Early in February, President Eisenhower set up a special commission and instructed it to "develop a broad outline of national objectives and programmes for the next decade and longer."

Here we come upon three curious facts.

Firstly, in setting up this commission, Washington publicly admitted that it had no national purpose to speak of.

Secondly, one of the men appointed to head the commission was Frank Pace, Jr., Chairman of the rocket-making General Dynamics Corp. The White House apparently thought that death merchants were best capable of formulating America's "national purpose."

And thirdly, the commission gave no sign of any activity after its establishment. It wasn't easy, evidently, to cook up a "national purpose" that could in any way stand up to the lofty ideals of communism.

And so *Life* came to its aid. Its editors launched a high-pressure publicity campaign, boasting that the articles it was about to print would stimulate "a fruitful national debate." They didn't, for the very simple reason that their authors had no fruitful ideas to offer. Some urged the restatement of America's ideals of the 18th and 19th centuries. But, as Walter Lippmann said, "the remedy for America's difficulties" should not be sought in the past but in "innovations of political formulae." However, neither he nor any other participant in the debate innovated such formulae. And the result was that this inglorious battle of ideas was won by David Sarnoff, Chairman of the Radio Corporation of America, who advocated an intensification of the cold war and proclaimed "defeat communism" as a statement of "national purpose."

Summing up the results of the debate, *Life* editors praised Sarnoff's prescription as "the most explicit summons to battle and call for victory in the cold war." Sarnoff's article, the editorial asserted, was "the most relevant to America's world situation today."

The results of this quest for a "national purpose" are paltry indeed. For it is the diehard policy of anti-communism, cold war and the arms drive that has caused confusion in the United States. It is this policy that has isolated Washington in the international arena. And that being so, how can such a "national purpose" stimulate anyone?

THE MELUN TALKS

The preliminary talks between the representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government and the French, which started in the little town of Melun (Seine-et-Marne Department) on June 25, are undoubtedly a development of great importance.

The very fact that the French government has agreed to meet the Algerians is evidence of the mighty sweep of the Algerian national-liberation movement. Neither the six years of heavy fighting nor the occupation of a large part of the country by an 800,000-strong French army have broken the Algerian people's determination to achieve independence.

At the same time, it means a victory for the progressive forces of France, whose struggle against the war in Algeria has assumed particularly wide scope in recent years.

In consenting to these negotiations, the Paris government took a wise step, one that is welcomed by French public opinion.

But the colonialist elements are growing more active. They want the war to go on, they refuse to give up.

dated. To those who have ears they speak loudly of the present.

The same forces in Washington bent on compacting with German militarism at the Soviet Union's expense. The same duplicity in the practice of that policy. The same lying to cover up aggressive designs and dishonest actions. Lastly, the same man doing this dirty work, now as director of U.S. intelligence.

As a man of politics he is of no great calibre, as an intelligence man—hardly of more than medium. Nothing in the world could make him a Talleyrand. He has influential friends among the financial oligarchy of New York and Bonn; he is filled with vicious, truly unquenchable hatred for the young socialist world; he has an undying devotion to the German tycoons and militarists to whom he in large measure owes his career. Perhaps that's enough to be head of America's intelligence....

But he has not the ability to analyze developments in their larger aspects, to see ahead, to assess the true relation of forces, to sense what the people are thinking. He has no principles, no real outlook, no judgment, he nearly always loses his game. He lost it during World War II. He lost it this spring in the shameful U-2 scandal. And he will go on losing it.

VI B 3 No. 106/43. Top secret Berlin, April 30, 1943

Top State Secret

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To

VI D

Interdepartmental

Subject: D u l l e s, Roosevelt's special representative in Switzerland.

Reference: Conference between Herr Dr. S c h ü d d e k o p f and SS-Hauptsturmführer A h r e n s.

Enclosed: - 1 -

Enclosed herewith for your information is a copy of the report by No. 144/7957 on his meeting with Roosevelt's special representative in Switzerland, D u l l e s.

Please let VI B 3 have the item on D u l l e s from "Who's Who."

VI B 3 will continue to gather information on D u l l e s.

On instructions,
Ahrens
SS-Hauptsturmführer

Translation of the document of Allen Dulles's conversations with SS intelligence (photostat inside front cover).